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 Suff ering and Punishment 
 MICHAEL  S BRADY * 
 I. Introduction 
 Suppose one thinks that judicial punishment is sometimes appropriate. Suppose 
one also thinks that appropriate punishment necessarily imposes burdens or hard 
treatment on the criminal. Suppose, fi nally, one thinks that in order to be genu-
inely burdensome, the wrongdoer needs to  suff er . Th e resulting account of just 
punishment raises a host of interesting and important questions concerning the 
relation between the negative emotions that constitute suff ering, punishment, 
the rights of off enders, and sentencing. Perhaps the most important concerns the 
fi nal supposition, and asks: Why must hard treatment take the form of imposing 
suff ering ? A plausible answer to this question, according to those who support 
the  Communicative Th eory of Punishment , will appeal to the communicative value 
that such imposition has. On this view, the imposition of suff ering constitutes a 
legitimate form of censure for wrongdoing, wherein the state communicates to the 
off ender the seriousness of his or her wrongdoing. At the same time, hard treatment, 
in the form of suff ering, provides the opportunity for and enabling conditions in 
which wrongdoers can come to recognise the nature of their wrongdoing, repent, 
make reparations, and reform themselves. Suff ering thus provides the means by 
which wrongdoers can make amends to those they have wronged  – who are owed 
repentance and reparations  – and also restore their own moral balance and char-
acter. Of course, the theory does not hold that suff ering  necessarily brings about 
these goods, or any others. Clearly, the suff ering imposed by the judiciary can 
have no positive eff ect, and indeed can (and oft en does) make things considerably 
worse, for the off ender and for society as a whole. Nevertheless, the communicative 
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theorist argues that suff ering is extremely important for the provision of these 
goods, in the sense that they would not be achieved in its absence. 
 Th is account faces a number of objections concerning the necessity of hard 
treatment, in the form of suff ering, for the achievement of the stated goods. In 
this chapter I will examine two of the most pressing worries, raised in a recent 
paper by Matt Matravers. Th ese are (i) that suff ering is not needed for censure and 
(ii) that the imposition of suff ering can lead to unfair sentencing. Aft er outlin-
ing the objections, I will suggest how the communicative theorist can respond, by 
invoking the idea that censure requires the expression of appropriate emotions, 
and the actions that are part and parcel of these. Hard treatment is thus warranted 
as an expression of appropriate emotion. 
 II. Suff ering as Ensuring Just Punishment 
 It is something of a platitude in moral philosophy that pain and suff ering are bad; 
indeed, it would be diffi  cult to fi nd a more obvious candidate for intrinsic disval-
ues than these. Hedonists are surely right about this, even if we can doubt that 
pain and suff ering are the  only things that are intrinsically bad. However, pain and 
suff ering also have great (extrinsic) value: those who are pain insensitive don ’ t live 
very long; we might say something similar about those who are unable to feel fear. 
Feelings of shame and guilt would seem to be essential to co-operative living with 
others; feelings of disappointment have great motivational force in getting us to do 
better next time. And so on. 
 We might think that suff ering is valuable from the social perspective in another 
important way: namely, suff ering is an appropriate form of payment for wrongdo-
ing. Here suff ering has value as  coin . Th is claim is most straightforwardly under-
stood in religious traditions as the idea that suff ering is just punishment for sin. But 
the claim has obvious secular counterparts when we look at judicial punishment. 
Here many people think that pain and suff ering are valuable because they are an 
essential part of punishment, and so an essential element in the proper functioning 
of society itself. To see this idea in more detail, let us look more closely at the nature 
of punishment, and make the case for a particular account of the justifi cation of the 
imposition of suff ering in punishment, namely the  Communicative Th eory . 
 What is punishment ? In  Leviathan , Th omas Hobbes wrote that  ‘ punishment is 
an evil infl icted by public authority on him that hath done or omitted that which 
is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law, to the end that the 
will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience ’. 1 In 1968, HLA Hart 
defi ned punishment as involving fi ve necessary conditions: 
 (1)  it must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant; 
 (2)  it must be for an off ence against legal rules; 
  1  Hobbes (1651/2008). 
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 (3)  it must be of an actual or supposed off ender for his off ence; 
 (4)  it must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the 
off ender; 
 (5)  it must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal 
system against which the off ence is committed. 2 
 A more contemporary defi nition yet is due to Hugo Bedau and Erin Kelly in the 
 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy : judicial or criminal punishment is  ‘ the author-
ized imposition of deprivations  – of freedom or privacy or other goods to which 
the person otherwise has a right, or the imposition of special burdens  – because 
the person has been found guilty of some criminal violation, typically (though not 
invariably) involving harm to the innocent ’. 3 
 Th ere are a number of important common elements in these defi nitions, which 
I assume go to the heart of our thinking about what punishment is. But for our 
purposes, the most signifi cant one is that punishment for wrongdoing, in the form 
of illegal or criminal acts, involves the imposition of pain or unpleasantness, depri-
vation or burdens. (Sometimes this is referred to as  ‘ hard treatment ’, and includes, 
as Antony Duff  puts it in his 2018  Stanford Encyclopedia article,  ‘ material imposi-
tions or exactions that are in themselves typically unwelcome: they deprive people 
of things that they value (liberty, money, time); they require people to do things 
that they would not normally want to do or do voluntarily (to spend time on 
unpaid community labour, to report to a probation offi  cer regularly, to undertake 
demanding programmes of various kinds) ’. 4 ) 
 It is thus tempting to think that the legal/secular model of punishment is 
defi ned  as necessarily involving the imposition of  suff ering onto the guilty, in 
the sense of some negative aff ective state of a suitable intensity. Now it might be 
objected here that negative aff ect need not be involved; the deprivations that Bedau 
and Kelly and Duff  cite  – of freedom and privacy and similar goods  – are not them-
selves instances of negative aff ect or experienced suff ering. Nevertheless, I take it 
that such losses only count as losses and as genuine deprivations  for the subject 
insofar as they are experienced  as burdens by the subject: that is, in a way that 
essentially involves negative aff ect. Th is explains our intuitions about the injustice 
of punishing the very rich with fi nes or other fi nancial penalties. Such things will 
only count as losses or as burdensome insofar as the rich care about what is lost, 
and in the case of fi nes they typically don ’ t. As a result, whilst punishment ought 
not to involve the imposition of  physical pain on criminals, punishment is of its 
essence meant to be burdensome, and it is diffi  cult to see how something can be 
a burden unless it is experienced as such by the wrongdoer. So legal punishment 
involves the intentional imposition, by the appropriate authority, of suff ering on 
the wrongdoer. 
  2  Hart (1968) 4 – 5. 
  3  Bedau and Kelly (2015). 
  4  Duff  and Hoskins (2018). 
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  5  Matravers (2011), 69. 
  6  Duff  (2001). 
  7  Ibid, 22. 
 Th is is what punishment  is . It ’ s another question whether the imposition of 
suff ering by legal authorities is ever  justifi ed or  appropriate . Th is is something 
which traditional retributivist accounts of punishment have had great diffi  -
culty in explaining, and a central reason why this approach to punishment fell 
out of favour in the twentieth century. As Matt Matravers writes, the reason for 
the theory ’ s  ‘ moribund state was that retributivism seemed to be plagued by a 
blank space where an argument was needed. Specifi cally, the retributive claim 
that  “ past wrongdoing (by an off ender) justifi es present suff ering (infl icted on that 
off ender for that wrongdoing) ” appears to be either deeply mysterious or mean-
inglessly circular. ’ 5 However, a recent development of a retributivist theory  – the 
 Communicative Th eory of Punishment  – fares much better on this account. In what 
follows I will outline how the communicative theory explains the appropriateness 
of  punishment, in a way that highlights the importance of suff ering in achieving 
punishment ’ s legitimate aims. 
 At the heart of the communicative theory is the idea  – as the name suggests  – 
that punishment is essentially a communicative enterprise, and that the ultimate 
justifi cation for the imposition of suff ering is that it serves a communicative 
purpose. Th is view accommodates both retributivist and reformist thinking, since 
(i) what is communicated in punishment is something merited or deserved by the 
criminal, and (ii) an internal goal of such communication is that the criminal rec-
ognise and acknowledge their wrongdoing, repent, make reparations, and reform 
themselves. To see the theory in more detail, let us turn to the work of perhaps the 
best-known communicative theorist, Antony Duff ; in what follows I focus in the 
main on his monograph  Punishment, Communication, and Community . 6 
 Duff  is concerned to argue against both consequentialist and  ‘ pure ’ retributiv-
ist accounts of punishment. Th e former, he proposes, are ultimately inconsistent 
with acknowledging the rights of the innocent  and the guilty, and as such will not 
ensure justice. Th e latter, on the other hand, fail to provide a plausible answer to the 
questions of  why the guilty deserve to suff er. We can reject the retributivist line that 
wrongdoers deserve to suff er because this is a way of ensuring the social value of 
 fairness . Th is, Duff  argues, is implausible, because it  ‘ off ers a distorted picture of the 
punishment-deserving character of crime ’. 7 Th e wrongs of physical assault or arson, 
for instance, clearly don ’ t consist in taking unfair advantage of the law-abiding 
or in being a free-rider. By the same token, the idea that punishment is a matter of 
paying back what one owes is problematic: murder victims are unable to be recom-
pensed for their loss, and a murderer doesn ’ t (arguably) owe  the state recompense. 
Moreover, there are many criminal activities that are not characterised as a form 
of profi t-making, and punishment for these is again poorly understood as a kind 
of paying back. Th ink again of physical assault or arson. So standard retributivist 
attempts at explaining why the wrongdoer deserves to suff er fail. 
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  8  Ibid, 27. 
  9  Th e issues of care and concern, and their relation to valuing lives, is the focus of Blum (2020) 
(chapter seven in this volume). 
  10  At  http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/8/1639/HMA-v-Tanveer-Ahmed . 
 Duff  maintains that punishment has a diff erent function to that of deterring 
crime or ensuring fairness. Instead, he thinks that legal punishment serves to com-
municate  ‘ the condemnation or censure that criminals deserve ’ for their crimes. 8 
Such condemnation is  required by the state ’ s concern for the rights and values that 
its laws are set up to protect, since failure to condemn implies that the state does 
not mean what it says when it prohibits certain activities. It is in this sense that 
punishment, as a form of condemnation and censure, is merited or deserved: it 
follows from the state ’ s commitment to the rights and values that the legal and 
judicial system are set up to protect and preserve, and the criminal ’ s violation of 
these rights and undermining of these values. In addition, by condemning and 
censuring criminal activity, the state also communicates concern for and solidarity 
with the victims of crime, and a willingness to punish others who break the law. 
Th ese too would seem to be implications of a genuine commitment to the values 
at stake. 9 
 Consider, in this light, the sentencing remarks made by Lady Rae in the High 
Court in Glasgow, upon sentencing Tanveer Ahmed for the murder of Assad Shah: 
 It is clear from the agreed facts presented to me that this was a barbaric, premedi-
tated and wholly unjustifi ed killing of a much loved man who was a pillar of the local 
community  … Let me be clear, no one in any civilised country including Scotland has 
the right to take the life of another, whatever off ence that individual perceives that he 
or she has suff ered. It is vitally important in modern society that respect and tolerance 
for others of every race, creed, colour, ethnic origin or religious belief is maintained and 
protected by the law of the land  … I shall have regard to the various factors put forward 
as mitigation but none of them can truly mitigate, to any great extent, the brutality of 
your actions; the premeditation and motive behind those actions; your lack of remorse 
and your pride in what you did. For all of these reasons I intend to impose an exemplary 
sentence. 10 
 Lady Rae ’ s words here clearly condemn the off ender for his off ence, in a way that 
expresses censure in the strongest terms, respect for the values that the off ender 
violated, and a clear willingness to punish as a result. (As we ’ ll see later, it is plausi-
ble to think that the words also express strong emotions on Lady Rae ’ s part, and at 
the same time generate, through imaginative engagement, emotions in those who 
hear or read them. It is not implausible to therefore view Lady ’ s Rae ’ s sentencing as 
a part of a pattern of emotional expression for the values that have been violated 
by this crime.) 
 Insofar as punishment communicates the censure that criminals deserve, 
it captures the retributivist intuition that punishment should be  ‘ backward-
looking ’, and address itself to the fact and nature of what a criminal did. But 
the retributivist element is only a part of the communicative theory, since the 
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  11  Duff  (2001), 80. 
  12  Ibid, 107. (My emphasis.) 
theory also wishes to accommodate the intuition that punishment should also be 
 ‘ forward-looking ’ and thus aim at reforming off enders. Duff  explains this element 
by noting that the communication of censure treats the off ender as a rational 
agent, and in doing so aims to promote a particular kind of response. (It is part of 
the  nature of communication to regard the other person in this way.) In particular, 
the off ender  ‘ is expected (but not compelled) to understand and accept the censure 
as justifi ed: to understand and accept that he committed a wrong for which the 
community now properly censures him. His trial and conviction thus address him 
and seek a response from him as a member of the political community who is both 
bound and protected by its laws. ’ 11 By communicating censure and condemnation 
in this way, the state hopes that the off ender will come to understand and recog-
nise his wrongdoing and to repent for his off ences; moreover, the state hopes that 
the off ender will, as a result of such recognition, be moved to make reparations 
to the victim, and to commit to reforming himself so that he does not behave 
that way in the future. Just as the state ’ s concern for particular values commits 
it to condemn acts that violate such values, so too does the criminal ’ s acknowl-
edgement and understanding of his wrongdoing commit him to repentance, the 
making of reparations, and reformation. For without the latter commitments, we 
can doubt that the off ender really does acknowledge and recognise that he did 
something wrong, or really does understand what he did. 
 Legitimate or justifi ed punishment therefore aims at giving criminals what they 
deserve, and at persuading them to recognise and acknowledge their wrongdoing, 
to repent, and reform. Still, we have yet to see exactly why censure, in the form of 
 suff ering , is essential for communication. What, in other words, is the justifi cation 
for imposing hard treatment on criminals ? Why must we communicate and moti-
vate reform by making off enders suff er losses and deprivations ? 
 Th ere are two strands to the communicative theorist ’ s answer to these ques-
tions. One focuses on the suff ering necessarily involved in acknowledging and 
accepting one ’ s wrongdoing. For Duff ,  ‘ an authentic recognition that I did wrong 
must bring with it repentance of that wrong. I recognize and own it as mine  – 
I  do  not deny it or seek to justify or excuse it. But I also disown it, as some-
thing that I should not have done and now wish I had not done.  Repentance is 
 necessarily painful , since it must pain me to recognize and admit (to myself and 
others) the wrong I have done. In aiming to induce repentance, punishment thus 
aims to bring off enders to suff er what they deserve to suff er  – the pains of repent-
ance and remorse. ’ 12 On this view, suff ering, in the form of feelings of remorse, 
is an essential part of the recognition and reform that punishment aims to bring 
about. In a paper from 2003 called  ‘ Probation, Punishment and Restorative 
Justice ’, Duff  continues this idea, stating that  ‘ censure must aim to produce pain, 
in that if the person is not pained by it, it has failed to achieve its aim. Th at aim 
is not, of course, simply to cause or induce pain: it is to induce the appropriate 
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  13  Duff  (2003), 186. 
  14  Duff  is resistant to the idea that imprisonment and fi nes are appropriate forms of censure, and 
he thinks that we need to think of more humane and eff ective forms of condemnation. See Matravers 
(2011), 76. 
  15  Duff  (2003), 189. 
  16  For a discussion of the role of emotion in motivating attention to legal questions, and in particular 
the attention of judges to matters of law, see White (2020) (chapter six in this volume). 
  17  (2001), 108. 
kind of pain  – the pain that is intrinsic to accepting criticism from one ’ s fellows 
and, even more importantly, the pain that is intrinsic to the recognition that one 
has wronged someone. ’ 13 
 Th e other focuses on a diff erent kind of burden and deprivation that the state 
intentionally imposes, namely community service, or probation, or some other 
burdensome reparative work. 14 Here the communicative theorist appeals to dif-
ferent but related ideas about the nature and function of communication involved 
in censure and condemnation. One idea is that censure and condemnation that 
is expressed  verbally  – for instance, by a guilty verdict and judge ’ s summing up of 
the off ender ’ s wrong in a court of law  – fails to constitute the kind of censure or 
condemnation that we need. Duff  writes: 
 With more serious wrongs, mere words cannot suffi  ce: they cannot suffi  ce to express, or 
to assure others of, the off ender ’ s repentant recognition of what she has done, any more 
than they can suffi  ce to communicate to the off ender the censure that she deserves. 
Punishment can then constitute a more forceful communication both of censure to the 
off ender, and of apology to those whom she has wronged. 15 
 Th e thought here would seem to be that the imposition of hard treatment is indeed 
necessary for the communication of censure; for communication has to be suitably 
forceful, and only hard treatment can supply the requisite force. 
 Th e second idea is that hard treatment in the form of suff ering has important 
eff ects on attention, and this can play a signifi cant role in bringing about repent-
ance and the other goods in question. 16 Th is is because suff ering focuses and cap-
tures attention, and in so doing makes it both diffi  cult to ignore some important 
or signifi cant object or event, and motivates refl ection about that object or event. 
Th e suff ering of hard treatment helps to ensure that the criminal cannot (so easily) 
ignore his criminal activity and his wrongdoing. As Duff  points out: 
 When I have done wrong, it is oft en tempting and all too easy to distract myself from 
the fact. I might say, to myself or to others,  ‘ Yes, I did wrong and am sorry for it. ’ I might 
think that I have now repented the wrong. But all too oft en I have not seriously repented, 
because I have not thought seriously enough about, that wrong  … Repentance, at least 
with serious wrongs  … must go deep with the wrongdoer and must therefore occupy 
his attention, his thoughts, his emotions, for some considerable time. 17 
 So another function of the imposition of burdens on the off ender is  ‘ to focus his 
attention on his crime ’, and ensure that repentance is suitably deep. Here suff ering 
plays a similar attention-directing role to that played by physical pain or forms of 
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  18  In his  Stanford Encyclopedia entry on  ‘ Legal Punishment ’, Duff  writes:  ‘ Punishment  … should 
aim not merely to communicate censure to the off ender, but to persuade the off ender to recognise and 
repent the wrong he has done, and so to recognise the need to reform himself and his future conduct, 
and to make apologetic reparation to those whom he wronged. His punishment then constitutes a 
kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the 
burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focus-
ing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation 
that he owes. ’ 
  19  For more on this, see Brady (2013). 
  20  Duff  (2001), 108. 
emotional suff ering: just as physical pain rules out the option of easily ignoring 
putative sources of physical damage, so too does the suff ering in legitimate forms 
of judicial punishment keep the off ender ’ s criminal wrongdoing in mind. So, at the 
very least, hard treatment makes it diffi  cult for the criminal to ignore his wrongdo-
ing, and ignore how seriously this kind of wrongdoing is regarded by the state and 
his fellow citizens. 18 
 Th ere is another connection between suff ering and attention that is impor-
tant here. For suff ering not only directs attention, but captures attention, and this 
helps to facilitate  – at least in the right circumstances  – an imaginative engage-
ment with, and an understanding of, emotional objects and events. 19 By making 
the criminal suff er, therefore, the state puts in place conditions for the criminal to 
refl ect and deliberate on what he did, in part through imaginatively engaging with 
the harm his wrongdoing caused to his victim, with what his victim felt, with the 
kind of reparations that might be appropriate, and with a future existence where 
his wrongdoing has been addressed and his moral character repaired. In this way 
the wrongdoer will hopefully come to recognise and understand the  nature of his 
wrongdoing, understand the eff ect it had on his victim, understand what he needs 
to do, and understand the shape his life from hereon has to take. As Duff  puts it, 
penal hard treatment  ‘ provides a structure within which, we hope, [the criminal] 
will be able to think about the nature and implications of his crime, face up to it 
more adequately than he might otherwise (being human) do, and so arrive at a 
more authentic repentance. As fallible moral agents, we need such penances to 
assist and deepen repentance. ’ 20 
 Th at suff ering provides the opportunity for focused attention and imagina-
tive engagement does not, of course, mean that it will bring about recognition, 
repentance, reform and reparations. Sometimes  – perhaps oft en  – wrongdoers will 
seek to shift  the blame elsewhere. Th e wrongdoer might believe, therefore, that 
he suff ers because  he is the victim of the judicial system, or his upbringing, or the 
police, or society in general. Such rationalising explanations of why he is being so 
deprived are doubtless common amongst those who suff er judicial punishment. 
But this need not be the outcome of suff ering ’ s imposition. Instead, sometimes a 
criminal will come, through having his attention fi xed on his wrongdoing and on 
how seriously the state takes this violation of these laws, to a recognition and an 
understanding of his wrongdoing, and of the steps he needs to take to rectify it. So 
in some instances at least, suff ering imposed will motivate acknowledgement and 
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understanding, and the repentance and remorse that are a part of these. Th e point 
here, then, isn ’ t that suff ering will  necessarily bring about a valuable end. Never-
theless, the understanding that is central to repentance and reform will be, for fal-
lible agents like us, highly unlikely without the focused attention and imaginative 
engagement that suff ering brings. If the state wants to achieve these valuable social 
goods, therefore, it will have to make criminals suff er. 
 So, at least, the communicative theory maintains. But there are worries about 
this approach to the justifi cation of hard treatment. In the following  section I will 
examine two such worries, and show how the communicative theorist can appeal 
to the connections between censure and emotion in order to respond. 
 III. Are Words Sometimes Enough ? 
 In a recent paper, Matt Matravers has raised worries about the need for suff er-
ing in legitimate punishment, and in particular about Duff  ’ s explanations of its 
importance. Matravers makes two related criticisms. 21 Th e fi rst is that suff ering is 
not necessary for censure  – on the grounds that sometimes words  are enough  – 
and so the censure at the heart of the communicative theory, and the imposition of 
suff ering, can diverge. If this is the case, then a second criticism becomes germane: 
in many cases, the imposition of suff ering will then be unfair, since those who 
come to acknowledge their wrongdoing, repent, reform themselves, and make 
reparations as a result of verbal censure alone will be unfairly punished by further 
impositions such as probation or community service. Let us take these criticisms 
in turn. 
 (i) Matravers begins by noting that on Duff  ’ s view, punishment is an intrinsi-
cally appropriate response to crime. Th is is because wrongdoing deserves moral 
criticism or censure, and wrongdoing of a certain kind is serious enough that it 
merits or deserves censure by the state. But Matravers notes that  ‘ the common or 
garden way in which one communicates censure or gratitude is by using certain 
words or phrases ’. 22 And it is at least  possible , he thinks, that communication of this 
sort can succeed in bringing about the suff ering at which punishment aims: namely 
the pain and suff ering that is intrinsic to accepting the criticism and condemnation 
of others, and recognising the wrongs that one has done. Matravers writes: 
 Th e claim is that sometimes words cannot suffi  ce to communicate to the off ender the 
censure that she deserves. But, why ? It cannot be that we genuinely cannot think of 
words that will do the job  … a combination of the richness of language and the fact that 
(as Duff  emphasizes) this is a two-way  communication in the context of a wrong done, 
makes me skeptical about applying the everyday thought that sometimes  “ words are not 
enough ” too quickly to these cases. 23 
  21  Matravers (2011). 
  22  Ibid, 75. 
  23  Ibid, 78. 
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 Now even if it is the case that  some people might come to fully accept the 
criticism and come to fully recognise and understand their wrongdoing, this is 
surely not true for most people. In these cases, Matravers notes that  ‘ it takes more 
than just verbal expression to focus one ’ s mind on what one has done. A repeat 
wife-beater may need not merely to hear censure, but to feel it, and he may need 
time over which to think through what he has done. ’ 24 Th is is where the second 
dimension of Duff  ’ s approach to the imposition of suff ering comes in: for many 
or most off enders suff ering  ‘ provides a structure within which, we hope, [the 
off ender] will be able to think about the nature and implications of his crime, face 
up to it more adequately than he might otherwise (being human) do ’. But Matra-
vers thinks that this is also problematic. For  ‘ in cases such as these, it is much 
harder to see that censure is simply being expressed in hard treatment and the 
latter is thus intrinsically appropriate. Rather, it seems more natural to say that the 
off ender has failed, or will fail, to appreciate the appropriate censure and so hard 
treatment is deployed to focus his mind on the censure that would otherwise be 
appropriately only verbal. ’ 25 So hard treatment  – in the form of community service, 
probation, etc  – is not itself part of or intrinsic to the censure or condemnation. 
Instead, it is best regarded as a valuable way in which the off ender ’ s mind can be 
focused on the state ’ s censure or condemnation, in the hopes that he will take it to 
heart and come to recognise and acknowledge his wrongful behaviour. If words 
can be enough for censure, therefore, then coerced punishments such as probation 
and community service are not the vehicles through which censure is expressed. 
 (ii) Th is gives rise to the second worry  – one that has been raised before against 
accounts of punishment that appeal to a  ‘ subjective ’ component like suff ering. 26 
Th e worry is that the communicative theory  – indeed, any account that appeals 
to the necessity of suff ering for punishment  – will lead to unfair and hence unjust 
punishments, and diff erential treatment for the same crimes. Matravers puts the 
argument as follows: 
 Once censure and the hard treatment needed to ensure the censure is heard are decou-
pled, then diff erential punishments will result. Some off enders will grasp immediately 
the full force of the wrong that they have done. For reasons to do with the need to reas-
sert the values of the community and to express the appropriate censure, the state must 
of course nevertheless censure them. However, why should that censure take a non-
verbal form ? One answer is that it is proportionate to the censure expressed in other 
cases where hard treatment was needed. But this looks as if the level of hard treatment 
appropriate as censure will be dictated by the off ender who is least able to respond to 
verbal signals and that surely cannot be right. Duff , I think, would say that the mistake 
here is to think of censure and hard treatment as two things and not one. Th e appropri-
ate censure for a given off ence just is what it is, and if that means words are not enough 
then words are not enough. However, as noted above, it is hard to grant that claim. 
  24  Ibid, 79. 
  25  Ibid. 
  26  See, for instance, David Gray (2010). 
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Words are enough to express censure of all kinds, but sometimes they are not enough to 
be heard. Th at, though, returns us to the baseline of the most thick-skinned off ender. 27 
 Th e thought is, therefore, that it is possible that some off enders will, when facing 
censure from the state, quickly recognise the wrongness of their behaviour, repent, 
commit to reforming themselves, and make appropriate reparations. Other 
off enders will not. Since the state needs to ensure parity of sentencing, and assure 
the community that we treat like cases alike, the state must impose the same hard 
treatment, in the form of coercive punishments, on those who accept the censure 
and repent, and on those who do not. But this seems both unfair to those who 
have  ‘ heard ’ the censure and accepted it, and contrary to the aims and spirit of 
the communicative theory. For in the former case, communication of censure has 
 worked and the aims of the theory have been achieved. Any further imposition 
of hard treatment would therefore only be warranted on other  – possibly conse-
quentialist  – grounds. (Th is is Matravers ’ s suggestion on p 80, where he is worried 
that such imposition is a matter of using that person  ‘ as a means to other ends ’.) If 
so, then the communicative theory is both unfair, and inconsistent with its own 
requirements. 
 In the following  section I will argue that the communicative theorist can 
respond to both of these worries, by focusing on the importance of emotion for 
sincere and forceful communication. 
 IV. Th e Role of Emotion in Censure and Condemnation 
 Matravers thinks that words can be enough to express censure and condemnation, 
and that as a result censure and hard treatment can be decoupled. I think that he is 
wrong on the fi rst count and (therefore) wrong on the second as well. For a condi-
tion on the successful expression of censure and condemnation is the presence 
of appropriate emotions, and the suite of evaluations, feelings, facial and bodily 
expressions, and actions that are their  constituents .  ‘ Saying the words ’ is only part 
of this suite, only part of what is really called for by the wrongdoing or off ence. As a 
result, words are not enough to express censure: other elements, including actions 
that constitute hard treatment, need to be in place. Since this is all rather abstract, 
let me explain by appeal to a non-judicial case of wrongdoing and censure, the 
kind of thing that can happen in a loving relationship. 28 
 Imagine that Alice and Ted are in a long-term relationship; indeed, they 
are thinking of getting married, raising a family, and are looking forward to 
  27  Matravers (2011), 79. 
  28  Th e importance of emotions, and in particular of empathy, for intimate relationships is  examined 
in Hansberg (2020) (chapter nine in this volume). My example focuses on the role that negative 
emotions have in such relationships, when it comes to expressing condemnation and motivating 
 appropriate behaviour. 
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spending the rest of their lives together. Six months before the wedding, at a 
Christmas party, Alice catches Ted kissing one of their friends, Carol, and experi-
ences a range of emotions: anger, hurt and contempt are prominent here. Con-
fronting Ted later that evening, Alice expresses these emotions in a variety of ways. 
She condemns Ted ’ s appalling behaviour, tells him how let down she feels, and 
how shocked that he would do this. Th ere are tears, curses, insults. Ted, mortifi ed, 
apologises profusely, and genuinely feels terrible. He reiterates his commitment 
to Alice, promises never to do anything like this again, and begs Alice to forgive 
him. Alice, though still deeply hurt, believes Ted. Nevertheless, the next few weeks 
are marked by temporary changes in their relationship: Alice gives Ted the  ‘ cold 
shoulder ’, refuses physical contact, is oft en abrupt and cutting in her remarks to 
him, and insists that he spends time away from the fl at that they share together. 
She insists that they go to couples counselling if the wedding is to go ahead, in 
order that Ted comes to think about and understand himself and his wrongdoing 
more clearly. Ted is, for his part, motivated to be a better person: to be kinder, more 
considerate, more committed, more loving, to Alice. Aft er a suffi  cient amount of 
time, their relationship takes on something like the shape it did before Ted acted 
so badly. Indeed, in some ways the relationship is stronger and deeper, although in 
other ways it has been damaged by the aff air. 
 Suppose we now ask: what is needed for Alice to express her censure and con-
demnation to Ted ? In this instance, would words be enough ? Clearly, Alice ’ s simply 
 saying the relevant words  –  ‘ How could you do this to me ? You heartless bastard ’, 
and so forth  – isn ’ t enough to express censure. Alice might aft er all say the words in 
a fl at, bored manner, in a tone that expresses her lack of concern about the values 
that Ted ’ s behaviour has damaged. At the very least, Alice will have to say the 
words in way that expresses or refl ects her anger, hurt and disappointment. Her 
words will, in other words, have to express her  emotions if they are to genuinely 
express censure and condemnation. 29 Th is isn ’ t merely an epistemic point  – that 
Ted won ’ t  believe that Alice thinks he behaved wrongly, in the absence of an exhibi-
tion of her emotions on her part  – although that is surely true. It ’ s the substantive 
point: that Alice ’ s words won ’ t express censure  at all unless they are the vehicle 
for the emotions generated by and themselves warranted by Ted ’ s wrongdoing. 
For it is not just censure, in the form of words, that Ted ’ s wrongdoing merits. It 
also merits the whole range of Alice ’ s emotions  – her anger, hurt, disappointment, 
sadness, and the like. Such emotions are not merely  expected in response to Ted ’ s 
betrayal. Instead, they are normatively  called for : they are warranted, fi tting, justi-
fi ed, appropriate, rational responses, so that someone who didn ’ t feel as Alice feels 
in the relevant circumstances would violate the relevant norms, and might well be 
criticisable for this reason. 
  29  Th is point will be familiar to, and readily accepted by,  internalists about moral judgements, who 
maintain that sincere moral judgement is essentially linked with  motivation . On that account, those 
who  ‘ say the words ’ but lack any motivation to act accordingly don ’ t really make moral judgements. See 
Smith (1995), for this line. Here I ’ m making a similar point, but focusing on the necessity of emotional 
responses for sincere or legitimate censure and condemnation. 
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 How can Alice ’ s words be the vehicle for her warranted emotional response ? It 
seems to me that this can only be the case if her verbal expression also expresses 
other emotional elements or aspects. Emotions typically involve facial and bodily 
expressions, and Alice ’ s words need to be accompanied by the relevant facial and 
bodily movements associated with anger and hurt, therefore. By the same token, 
Alice ’ s words will need to express her aff ective state  – how she  feels  – and so will 
have to have a particular tone or force. Again, these are not merely epistemic 
points  – that Ted won ’ t believe that Alice thinks he behaved wrongly, in the absence 
of the relevant facial expressions and feelings on her part  – although this is also 
surely true. It ’ s the substantive point: that Alice ’ s words won ’ t express censure  at all 
unless her expression of them embodies the facial and bodily and aff ective ele-
ments that are characteristic of anger, hurt, and the like. To be sure, some of these 
might be subtle: a slight change in the tone of voice, a stiff ening of the posture, a 
downturn of the mouth, a narrowing of the eyes  – these can all convey or express 
anger, and so bodily and facial expressions don ’ t have to be as overt as they would 
be in the case of someone who is  ‘ pure ragin ’, to use the excellent Scottish phrase. 
Still, it would be diffi  cult to understand how Alice ’ s words can express censure in 
the absence of any facial and bodily changes, and in the absence of any feelings on 
her part. It is certainly diffi  cult to see how any verbal expressions could be  forceful , 
in the absence of these emotional components. 
 Th is paves the way for a response to Matravers. For it is plausible to claim 
that expression of censure equally requires the appropriate behaviour on Alice ’ s 
part. Could Alice express censure and condemnation to Ted  without giving him 
the cold shoulder, without breaking off  physical contact, and the like ? Consider 
how anomalous her angry words, and angry facial and bodily postures, would 
be if Alice immediately welcomed his apologies with warm embraces, if their 
loving intimacy resumed without pause, if there were no period  at all where Ted 
was shunned, left  alone to think and refl ect on what he ’ d done, to stew in his 
misery. Th is suggests not simply that Alice ’ s behavioural responses are normal 
or typical responses to infi delity; instead, they are what is to be expected in the 
normative sense, where the absence of such responses would again be anoma-
lous and indeed  criticisable . (Imagine how Alice ’ s friends would react if Alice 
failed to give Ted the cold shoulder, at least for a while. Wouldn ’ t they  – and 
we  – be inclined to think that Alice isn ’ t acting as she ought, that she is perhaps 
lacking in self-esteem to some degree, or too dependent upon or reliant on Ted 
for her own good ? ) If so, then we might claim that certain patterns of behaviour 
are required if Alice is to appropriately express censure and condemnation of 
Ted ’ s actions. It isn ’ t enough for her to say the words, to say them with emotion, 
and to look as though she means them; she has to  act as though she means them 
as well, and so her behaviour will have to follow suit for her expression to be 
genuine. If so, then (forceful) expression of censure and condemnation requires 
the appropriate words, said with feeling, expressed by the appropriate facial and 
bodily expressions, and accompanied by particular and fi tting patterns of behav-
iour. Th e relevant actions, in other words, are not mere focusing devices whereby 
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Ted is given the opportunity to refl ect and repent. Instead, they are part of what 
(forceful) censure and condemnation  is . 
 Th e application to the judicial case should, I hope, be reasonably clear. 
Th e state ’ s censure and condemnation of an off ender cannot consist in merely 
 ‘ saying the words ’ , no matter how rich the language involved, if we think that the 
words must also express the appropriate emotions. Here, too, I assume that the 
appropriate emotions are (legitimate) anger, with a wide range of other emo-
tional possibilities: perhaps contempt; perhaps moralised disgust in the case 
of particularly reprehensible crimes. Judicial condemnation must refl ect and 
express the (legitimate) feelings of the state: feelings that are fi tting when its 
laws are violated and its values undermined. As with the case of a loving rela-
tionship, this isn ’ t merely an epistemic point  – that the off ender won ’ t believe 
that the state thinks he acted wrongly, in the absence of the underlying emotions 
and their expression in the courtroom  – although this is also surely true. It is 
the more substantive point: that the court ’ s words won ’ t express censure  at all 
unless they are accompanied by the emotions, and emotional expressions, that 
are characteristic of moralised anger and hurt. At the very least, it is diffi  cult 
to see how any verbal expression of censure could be suitably forceful in the 
absence of emotions and their elements. 
 Given all this, we can claim that the state ’ s (forceful) expression of censure 
 requires appropriate action on the state ’ s part. Indeed, we might think that 
appropriate action is the most obvious and most eff ective way in which the state 
can express emotion, and so express what the off ender deserves. (It is less easy to 
see how the state could convey particular facial expressions or other emotional 
components.) Just as Alice ’ s expression of censure and condemnation of Ted ’ s 
actions required a certain pattern of behaviour that is meant to be burdensome 
for Ted  – that is intended to make Ted suff er in addition to his pains of remorse 
and regret  – the state ’ s expression of censure and condemnation of criminal 
off ences likewise require the imposition of hard treatment on the off ender. 
 Anything less than this makes the state itself liable to criticism, in much the 
same way that Alice is liable to criticism should she fail to impose burdens on 
Ted as a result of his actions. Th e imposition of hard treatment on to criminals 
is not a mere focusing device; it is, on this view, intrinsic to the censure that the 
off ender deserves. 
 Now there are, of course, clear diff erences between the case of Alice and Ted, 
and the case of the state ’ s imposition of hard treatment on someone who commits 
a criminal off ence. It might be claimed, for instance, that the state is not the kind 
of thing that can  have emotions, and hence not the kind of entity that can express 
them in words or actions. It doesn ’ t make sense, therefore, to talk as if the state ’ s 
censure is only legitimate insofar as it expresses the state ’ s anger etc. However, 
claims like this about the possibility or otherwise of group emotions are clearly 
controversial, and so provide questionable grounds for detaching state censure and 
hard treatment. Aft er all, we oft en  talk as if groups, indeed states and nations, have 
emotions: we naturally say things like the following: that the country is ashamed 
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of its wartime conduct, the citizenry are anxious about the state of the economy, 
the nation is overjoyed at winning the World Cup, the populace is in mourning 
over the death of the princess. And whilst it might be plausible to deny that states 
or collectives can have genuinely shared  feelings or  aff ective experience , it is much 
less plausible to deny that states can have collective beliefs, collective values, and 
engage in collective action. Indeed, the claim that the state takes seriously viola-
tions of its laws, that it respects all of its citizens, and so forth, only makes sense if 
we think that the state is the kind of thing to which we can attribute values, cares 
and concerns. It is hardly a stretch, therefore, to think that states can express things 
like anger when its laws are violated. 30 
 A second worry is more serious, and might nudge us towards a weaker response 
on behalf of the communicative theorist. Th e worry is that arguably only  some 
emotional elements need to be in place for censure to be expressed, rather than all, 
and so censure need not require action. Th ere are, aft er all, emotions without par-
ticular behavioural expressions  – some aesthetic emotions, for instance wonder, 
might be like this  – and so it is not true that all emotions require expression in 
action as well as words. Might it not be possible, therefore, for Alice to express 
censure of Ted ’ s behaviour by verbal means alone ? If so, then censure and the 
imposition of hard treatment can come apart. By analogy, the state can succeed in 
censuring an off ender by saying the relevant words in a court of law in a way that 
expresses the state ’ s seriousness and anger, without imposing hard treatment in the 
form of probation, community service, and the like. Hard treatment is not, on this 
view, intrinsic to censure. 
 As we saw, Matravers thinks that this leads to problems for the communica-
tive theorist. Matravers asks:  ‘ why should  … censure take a non-verbal form ? One 
answer is that it is proportionate to the censure expressed in other cases where 
hard treatment was needed. But this looks as if the level of hard treatment appro-
priate as censure will be dictated by the off ender who is least able to respond to 
verbal signals and that surely cannot be right. ’ Th e worry, recall, is that imposing 
hard treatment on someone who has recognised their off ence and is genuinely 
remorseful and repentant, on the grounds that this imposition is appropriate for 
off enders who do not and are not, is both unfair, and can only be justifi ed on 
extrinsic grounds, such as the need for proportionality in sentencing. But it seems 
inappropriate to punish someone who is genuinely remorseful on the grounds that 
another off ender is not. 
  30  Th ere are, of course, signifi cant diff erences between groups, collectives and states. Groups and 
collectives suggest a level of informality, whereas states are institutional structures. Nevertheless, insti-
tutional structures can arguably have beliefs, values and other attitudes: for instance, the University of 
Glasgow values educational opportunities for all, the pursuit of knowledge and understanding, and so 
on. In the UK Parliament, it is oft en said that  ‘ this House believes ’, etc. Small-scale groups can also be 
institutional: think of the golf club, with its rules and regulations. So the diff erences of scale between 
groups and states don ’ t, I think, undermine the central point that I ’ m making here. Th anks to the 
editors of this volume for pushing me to say more on this issue. 
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 Th ere are two responses we might make to this objection. Th e fi rst acknowl-
edges that certain emotions  – such as aesthetic emotions  – lack an  ‘ actional ’ 
element, but insists that the emotions involved in expressing censure are not of 
this category. Instead, they are precisely the kinds of emotions that have a behav-
ioural response at their heart: emotions such as anger, a sense of justice, compas-
sion for the victims of crime, and so on. Not all emotions require behavioural 
expression, therefore, but arguably those involved in censure and condemnation 
do. If so, then censure and the imposition of hard treatment do not come apart. 
 A second response admits (for the sake of argument) that censure and 
actional elements can diverge, but maintains that this does not entail that the 
imposition of hard treatment is unfair. For if censure expresses appropriate 
emotion, and if hard treatment is an appropriate behavioural expression of this 
emotion, then the imposition of hard treatment would seem to be warranted, 
even if it is not required. Th e fact that censure  need not involve the imposition 
of hard treatment  – the fact that in some circumstances words and facial and 
bodily expression might be enough to express censure  – does nothing to under-
mine the appropriateness of hard treatment when it  is imposed. For since such 
an imposition is a perfectly appropriate way for emotion to be expressed, then 
the off ender can have no grounds for complaint about its imposition, and so the 
imposition cannot be in some way unfair or unjust. Consider again the case of 
Alice and Ted. Perhaps it is possible for Alice to express censure verbally, pro-
vided that enough of the other components of emotion are in place; perhaps, 
then, she doesn ’ t need to give Ted the cold shoulder, ask him to leave the fl at for 
a period of time, and so on. Nevertheless, since such behaviour is an entirely 
appropriate way for Alice to express her anger, Ted could hardly have any com-
plaints if Alice  did behave in this way. He might count himself fortunate in a 
situation where Alice does not do so, but is in no position to object to treatment 
that is merited by his bad behaviour. Th is remains true  even if Ted fully recog-
nises his wrongful behaviour, and is fully remorseful and apologetic, as a result 
of verbal censure. Even in this instance, Ted will have no grounds to complain if 
Alice also gives him the cold shoulder. 
 Something similar can be said about the judicial case. Even if censure need 
not involve the imposition of hard treatment, the off ender is in no position to 
object should the state impose such treatment  – given that the state ’ s anger is 
merited by the wrongdoing, and the imposition of hard treatment is an appropri-
ate behavioural expression of that anger. Such treatment is an intrinsically appro-
priate response to wrongdoing, therefore. Th is remains true  even if the off ender 
fully recognises his off ence, and is fully remorseful and apologetic. Moreover, 
given the  extrinsic benefi ts of hard treatment  – both in terms of increasing the 
likelihood of recognition and apologetic reparations in most cases of off ence, 
and in terms of the deterrent eff ect on others  – there are additional reasons for 
the state to impose hard treatment that go beyond its intrinsic appropriateness. 
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So even if the imposition of hard treatment is not strictly necessary for the 
expression of censure, there might nevertheless be good intrinsic and extrinsic 
reasons to do so. 
 V. Conclusion 
 Th e communicative theory of punishment, especially as that theory is formulated 
by Antony Duff , maintains that hard treatment is an intrinsically appropriate 
response to criminal wrongdoing. Matt Matravers questions this account, and 
maintains that the imposition of suff ering is at best a focusing device to enable 
off enders to  ‘ hear ’ the censure that can be fully expressed by words alone. But 
I think that Matravers is wrong on this point. Words alone will not express censure, 
unless they are also expressive of the emotional responses that are themselves 
merited by wrongdoing. Since emotional responses involve appropriate behaviour, 
then such behaviour is itself merited or warranted by wrongdoing. On a strong 
version of this response, this means that censure and hard treatment do not come 
apart. On a weaker version, then it is possible for censure and hard treatment 
to diverge, but the off ender is in no position to complain about its imposition. 
Either way, Duff  is right in thinking that hard treatment is an intrinsically appro-
priate response to wrongdoing. Th e communicative theory can therefore explain 
why it is legitimate for the state to make off enders suff er through the intentional 
 imposition of hard treatment. 
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